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A Parent's Rights Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: Does Kentucky's De Facto
Custodian Statute Violate Due Process?
BY ELIZABETH ASHLEY BRUCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story about T.S. T.S. is a thirteen year-old boy who has an
unhealthy relationship with his parents. One day T.S. becomes so
dissatisfied, he walks from his parents' home to his grandparents' home.
While living with his grandparents, T.S. thrives; he performs better in
school, participates in extracurricular activities, and attends church. In fact,
"[a]ccording to his teachers and coaches, T.S. is a well-adjusted and
content teenager," a marked change from the unhappy boy they had known
before.1 After living in his grandparents' home for two months, T.S.'s
parents move, leaving him behind. T.S. lives happily with his grandparents
for two years, rarely communicating with his parents. T.S.'s grandparents
provide for all of his needs, physically, financially, and emotionally. One
day T.S.'s parents secretly arrange to have him taken to camp. T.S. is
physically removed from his grandparents' home and transported to the
camp, where he stays for one month. Greatly upset by the actions of T.S.'s
parents, his grandparents petition for custody of him.2 After granting
standing, the court grants the grandparents' petition for full custody of
T.S.'
* B.A. 2000, University of Evansville; J.D. expected 2004, University of
Kentucky. Special thanks to my mother, the writer; my father, the lawyer; and to
my husband for all of his support.
'Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777,779 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1110 (2003).
2Id.
3 d. at 780.
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The preceding paragraph relates the facts of Sherfey v. Sherfey,4
recently decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Based on the facts
presented, the result of this case seems both logical and in the best interest
of the child; however, the outcome of the case is riddled with controversy.
In the United States, a parent's right to care for his or her child is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and is, and has been,
fiercely protected by the judicial system.5 The Fourteenth Amendment
authoritatively states that "[n]o state shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."6 In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court interpreted "liberty" to include the right of parents to have
control over the upbringing of their children.7 In Prince v. Massachusetts,
the Supreme Court stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."8 Thus, parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their
children, and courts should interfere only when necessary.9
Despite parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit, some
parents execute those rights in a manner that is not only questionable,
but completely unsatisfactory. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated
in Sherfey v. Sherfey, "Over the past century, changing demographics
have greatly altered traditional notions of the average American family."'"
The court also noted that children having "parental-type relationships"
with third parties have become increasingly common." As a result, states
are often required to confer nonparental custody or visitation rights
upon persons other than a child's biological parents for the child's well-
being. 2
One type of nonparental status granted by courts is "de facto custo-
dian." In Kentucky, a de facto custodian is defined as a person who has
taken over the role of parent as caregiver, provider, and guardian. 3
4 See id. at 777.
51 Id. at 781-82.6U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
8 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
9 Id.; Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 782.





13 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 403.270(1) (Banks-Baldwin
2002). The statute provides in pertinent part that:
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Kentucky Revised Statutes ("K.R.S.") section 403.270(a)(1) confers upon
de facto custodians the same status as a child's biological parents in a
custody proceeding. 4 Not surprisingly, this statute has been attacked for
permitting nonparents to have equal standing with parents in exercising the
parental rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.15 Although Kentucky permits nonparental third parties
equal standing in this situation,16 some states do not, suggesting that grant-
ing equal standing to nonparents may infringe upon the parents' Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 7
Kentucky must consider whether giving de facto custodians the same
standing in custody matters as parents violates the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. If it is constitutional, is it appropriate? To analyze these
issues, Part II of the Note will examine parental rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 Part 1II will discuss the Supreme Court's current stance on
parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 and Part IV will analyze
the concept of de facto guardianship." Standing will be discussed generally
in Part V, ' and the Kentucky approach to standing will be evaluated in
(1)(a) As used in this chapter... "de facto custodian" means a person
who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the
primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided
with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under
three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child
is three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for
Community Based Services.
Id. § (1)(a).
" Id. § (1)(b) ("Once a court determines that a person meets the definition of
de facto custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in custody
matters that is given to each parent under this section and KRS 403.280, 403.340,
403.350, 403.420, and 405.020.").
"5 Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 781.
16 K.R.S. § 403.270(1).
17 See, e.g., In re Crystal J., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that although California law grants de facto custodians standing in custody
matters, this does not confer to them rights equal to that of the natural parents);
Clifford v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Bradbury v. Charlebois (In re Guardianship of Mikrut), 858 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that to effect a de facto termination there must be proof of
parental unfitness).
18 See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.20 See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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Parts VI and VII.2 2 Finally, the Note will evaluate how other jurisdictions
approach the same issue in Part V111.23
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. 24 Inherent within the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause is that of parents to participate in and control the raising of
their children without state interference in this private area of family life.25
In making this assertion, the Supreme Court of the United States has
examined the depth and breadth of parental rights. In Meyer v. Nebraska,
the Court explored a citizen's rights under the Due Process Clause.26 The
Court stated,
Without doubt, [liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
... to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
27
The Court clearly established that the right to "bring up children" is an
essential liberty that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.28
The Supreme Court addressed the subject of parental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment again in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, wherein
the Court followed Meyer, and expounded on the meaning of "bring up
children., 29 In Pierce, the Court held that part of parents' liberty in raising
their children included making decisions regarding their children's educa-
22 See infra notes 78-118 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).26 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
27 id.
28 Id.
29 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
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tion.3 ° Particularly, if a law passed by a state "unreasonably inter-fere[d]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control,"'" then the law violated the Due
Process Clause by depriving parents of a fundamental liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.32
The Court, in explaining the definition of parental rights under the
Constitution, stated that a child is a person, "not the mere creature of the
state" and that "those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."33 Therefore, parents or guardians not only have a right to care
for their children, but also a right to control and direct their children in
various aspects of life until they reach adulthood.34
The Court focused on the personal identity of a child as a human being,
rather than looking at the child in the objective terms of the law.35 The
Supreme Court has a responsibility to ensure that each child is protected by
the Constitution. It achieves this objective by recognizing that parents have
a fundamental right to raise their children in the manner in which the
parents deem best.
36
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S CURRENT STANCE
ON PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Today, the Supreme Court continues to protect the rights of parents in
controlling the upbringing of their children, having changed little from the
foundations set in Prince, Meyer, and Pierce. Recently, in Troxel v.
Granville,37 the Supreme Court reiterated its previous holding in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg,38 stating that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause has a substantive component that 'provides heightened pro-
tection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests,' including parents' fundamental right to make decisions
30 id.
31Id.
32 Id. at 535.
33 id.
34 Id. at 534-35.
31 Id. at 535.
36 id.
3 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
38Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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concerning the care, custody and control of their children."3 9 The Court
also held that as long as parents are "fit," they have a right to care for and
control their children, raising them as the parents choose, including limiting
their children's visitation with other parties.4 ° These "other parties" include
grandparents.4" As a result, third party visitation statutes will violate Due
Process if they are applied in a manner that accords no weight to parents'
decisions regarding visitation. Such a statute would be unconstitutional
because it would infringe upon a fit parent's determination of what is in his
or her child's best interests.42
Currently, the Court operates under a presumption that "fit parents act
in their children's best interests." '43 As a result, a state may not interfere
with familial matters as long as there is an adequate parent to care for the
child. In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that parents are "presumed
to be the preferred and primary custodians of their minor children," to the
exclusion of other parties who assert themselves as custodians." In Stanley
v. Illinois, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a father, who
has not been deemed an unfit parent, is denied due process rights under an
Illinois statute that presumes unfitness for unwed fathers, but not for unwed
mothers. 45 The Court wisely held that "[t]he private interest here, that of a
man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." '46 It reiterated
its prior holdings concerning the importance of parental rights, and deemed
the right to "conceive and to raise one's children" to be of the utmost
importance. 47 The Court also addressed the changing needs of society, and
after a thorough analysis held that the law certainly did "recognize those
family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."' As a result,
parents---regardless of marital status-have a constitutionally protected
" Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720).
40 Id. at 68-70.
41 Id. at 72-73.
42 d. The Court noted that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a state to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a 'better' decision would be made." Id.
431d. at 58.
" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1993).
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right under the Fourteenth Amendment to retain custody of their children
absent a court determination of unfitness.49
Not only must parents be deemed unfit before his or her parental rights
can be relinquished, but-according to Santosky v. Kramer--unless it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parents violated the law
regarding the care of his or her child, the parents' due process rights have
been violated if the child is removed.5' Santosky involved a New York
statute that allowed parental rights to be dissolved if the parents were found
to have "permanently neglected" their children. 2 The statute only required
proof of neglect by a "fair preponderance of the evidence." 3 In dealing
with this issue, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]efore a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due
process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence."54 This case is exemplary of the Supreme Court's
highly protective attitude toward parental rights. By requiring a clear and
convincing standard for removal statutes, the Supreme Court solidified its
commitment to the fundamental nature of parents' rights to raise their
children.5
The Supreme Court's previous holdings illustrate that the rights of
parents are not only fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
that the Court will vigorously protect this fundamental right in almost all
instances.
These Supreme Court cases all involved children who were adequately
cared for in their parents' custody. In Sherfey, the facts are not as clear.
Although there was no specific judicial hearing regarding the fitness of the
parents in Sherfey, the court noted that as applied the statute "directly
implicate[d] at least two of the former unfitness factors."56 The Sherfey case
is difficult due to the facts that the natural parents in question did not
display interest in their child and, although the parents would likely have
49 Id. at 649; see also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
50 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
11 Id. at 747-48.521 d. at 747 (citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b.4.(d), 384-b.7(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982)).




56 Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 1110 (2003).
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been deemed unfit, they still were not granted a hearing to specifically
determine their overall fitness as parents.
IV. DE FACTO CUSTODIANSHIP
Courts have long recognized persons who act in loco parentis. This
phrase refers to a person "[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child."57
Thus, a person acting in loco parentis is acting as a parent would for a
child.58 A de facto custodian is not a legal parent, but his or her relationship
with the child mirrors that of a natural parent; namely, a de facto custodian
provides physical and psychological support for the child.59 A de facto
custodian "establishes his status by acting in loco parentis."6 Thus, a de
facto custodian may be a stepparent, an extended family member, a family
friend, a grandparent, or anyone who has a significant psychological
relationship with a child, who provides essential physical and emotional
support for that child.
Due to the melancholy circumstances of children who are unwanted by
their parents, not properly cared for, left in another's care for expansive
amounts of time, or do not receive sufficient care from their parents, courts
have been called upon to grant these custodians some form of rights.
Courts in the United States have taken vastly different approaches to
the subject of de facto custodians and their rights. In some states like
California, de facto custodians are not afforded many of the rights that
biological parents enjoy, including the right to reunification services,
custody, or visitation.6 On the other hand, after the Kentucky Legislature
passed the De Facto Guardian Amendment in 1998, persons granted de
facto custodian status were granted equal standing and rights similar to a
biological parent concerning child custody proceedings.62 This situation has
caused much debate, and the essential question is whether it is constitu-
tional for a state to allow a person who is not a child's parent to retain
parental rights in regard to the child when there is a biological parent
57 In locoparentis means "in the place of a parent." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
791 (7th ed. 1999).
58 id.
" Annette R. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 720-28 (2001).
60 Hall v. Indiana, 346 N.E.2d 584, 586 n.2 (Ind. 1976).
61 Clifford v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
62 K.R.S. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
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willing to do so. Kentucky courts have held that it is constitutional,63
whereas other states disagree.' The Supreme Court of the United States has
yet to decide on this issue.
V. STANDING
Standing is closely related to the status of a de facto custodian. De
facto custodianship may, depending on state law, confer upon parents and
nonparents equal standing in a proceeding regarding the child. The primary
issue in Sherfey was whether it was constitutional for the court to grant the
grandparents standing equal to that of the child's parents in custody
proceedings.65 The Supreme Court of the United States has discussed the
standing inquiry as involving a "careful judicial examination of a com-
plaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted."' If a person does not
possess standing in a matter, that person may not appear before the court
concerning that matter.67 In the case of a de facto custodian, if the custodian
does not possess standing equal to a biological parent in a custody
proceeding, then the de facto custodian will be unable to assert a petition
for custody of the child if the parents also desire custody.68 In Sherfey v.
Sherfey, if the grandparents lacked standing in their capacity as de facto
custodians, they would have been unable to participate in custody pro-
ceedings to obtain guardianship of their grandson.69 As a result, the custody
issue on behalf of the grandparents would never have been heard, and
T.S.'s parents would have been able to assert custody over the child. There
would have been no available remedy for the grandparents.
There are many cases regarding child custody in which standing issues
arise. For example, in Alfano v. Richardson, foster parents were deemed to
lack standing to assert custody rights over a mentally retarded child placed
in their custody when the biological parents initiated custody proceedings.70
63 Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 1110 (2003).
6' See, e.g., Froelich v. Clark (In re Guardianship of L.L. and J.L.), 745 N.E.2d
222, 230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Bradbury v. Charlebois (In re Guardianship of
Mikrut), 858 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
61 Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 780.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).67 Id. at 750-51.
68 /d.
69 Shefey, 74 S.W.3d at 780.
70 Alfano v. Richardson, No. CV94 053 9266, 1995 WL 534232, *11 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1995).
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In Kentucky, there are certain situations in which nonparents have standing
as well as parents, such as in de facto custodian cases."
Kentucky is not alone in this respect.72 Other states also allow
nonparents to have standing in cases regarding the child.73 In Colorado, a
person who has custody of a child for more than six months is held to have
standing, mirroring the approach taken in Kentucky.74 Also,.in Illinois, a
nonparent has standing to petition for custody as long as the child is not in
the physical custody of a parent.75 These courts have determined that a
nonparent, in certain instances, may be afforded standing to assert either
their rights or a child's rights regarding custodial matters.
On the other hand, there are jurisdictions that disagree. In Bowie v.
Arder, the Michigan Supreme Court held that de facto custodianship by a
nonparent is not a sufficient relationship to merit standing, unless the de
facto custodians have been deemed the child's legal guardians.76 As a
result, unless the nonparent has been appointed as the sole guardian of the
child, he or she does not have standing to assert custody of the child.77 It is
clear that there is a definite conflict regarding the status of a de facto
custodian and whether a de facto custodian is able to obtain standing in
court regarding custody of the child at issue.
VI. THE KENTUCKY APPROACH
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
absent a showing of unfitness, courts should generally refrain from
interfering in family matters.7" Historically, Kentucky has followed the
7' Williams v. Phelps, 961 S.W.2d 40, 41-42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
72 In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 251-52 (Colo. 1995); In re
Marriage of Siegel, 648 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
71 See, e.g., C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 251; Siegel, 648 N.E.2d at 610-1.
74 C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 251.
75 Siegel, 648 N.E.2d at 610.
76 Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568, 577 (Mich. 1992). In Bowie, the child's
natural parents were not married. The child, Ashlee and her mother, Carolyn, lived
with Carolyn's mother. The child's father did not reside with them. Eleven months
after Ashlee's birth, Carolyn died. Ashlee continued to live with her grandmother
until her father, Milton Arder, took custody of her a year after Carolyn's death. The
grandmother petitioned for custody and the court denied her request, stating that
the grandmother lacked standing, even though the child had lived with her
grandmother for the first two years of her life. Id. at 570-71.
77Id.
78 See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
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Supreme Court in this regard, holding in McNames v. Corum that "before
any court even considers the best interest of the child in an action involving
parent and non-parent.., there must first be a showing that the parent is
not a fit person to have custody."79 Later, in Davis v. Collinsworth, the
Kentucky Supreme Court reiterated the McNames holding and set forth
guidelines for a showing of parental unfitness, including "(1) evidence of
inflicting or allowing to be inflicted physical injury, emotional harm or
sexual abuse; (2) moral delinquency; (3) abandonment; (4) emotional or
mental illness; and (5) failure, for reasons other than poverty alone, to
provide essential care for the children."8 The evidence standard to estab-
lish unfitness is clear and convincing evidence." If the burden is met, the
parent may be deemed unfit and custody may be granted to a party other
than the child's biological parents.82
Nevertheless, in Wynn v. Wynn, a case decided prior to the passage of
K.R.S. section 403.270(1), the Kentucky Court of Appeals permitted a
nonparent to gain custody of a child when one parent was alive, without a
specific finding of unfitness.83 In Wynn, the child resided with his father
and grandparents in the same home. When the father died unexpectedly, the
grandparents petitioned for full custody of the child.' Although the trial
court examined factors pertinent to parental unfitness, the court affirmed
the trial court's award of full custody to the grandparents without a specific
court determination that the child's mother was unfit.85
In Lewis v. Lewis, a mother left her child at the grandparents' home,
where the child lived happily for eleven years.86 The Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld an award of custody to the grandparents over the mother's
petition.87 The mother was not found to be an unfit parent, but rather the
court bypassed the issue of unfitness and decided the case on the basis of
the child's best interests.88 Therefore, in limited instances, the formerly
required showing of unfitness was not always implemented, even prior to
the passage of K.R.S. section 403.270.89
79 McNames v. Corun, 683 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Ky. 1985).80 Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989).
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Wynn v. Wynn, 689 S.W.2d 608, 609-10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
8Id. at 609.
85 Id. at 609-10.
86 Lewis v. Lewis, 343 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ky. 1961).
87Id. at 148-49.
88Id. at 149.
89 See id.; Wynn, 689 S.W.2d at 609-10.
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The passage of K.R.S. section 403.270 dramatically changed the state
of de facto parenthood in Kentucky. Now, rather than requiring a showing
of unfitness or a waiver of parental rights, a person who meets the de facto
custodian requirements possesses standing equal to a biological parent in
a custody proceeding without a specific showing of unfitness. 9 This allows
a court to bypass a separate fitness determination, expediting the determina-
tion of the best interests of the child once de facto custodian status has been
established.
In Sherfey, the parents argued that the passage of K.R.S. section
403.270(1) upset the former constitutional standard by no longer specifi-
cally requiring a showing of parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence, and by eliminating the factors required by McNames.9' At first
glance, this would seem to directly conflict with the Supreme Court
standard that a parent must be deemed unfit in order for the parent's Due
Process rights to be protected. 92 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however,
reasoned that K.R.S. section 403.270(1) did not violate the Sherfeys'
constitutional rights because the court did "not believe that the passage of
K.R.S. 403.270(1) significantly alter[ed] the preexisting law of custody
determination in Kentucky. 93
Kentucky defines the requirements and limits upon de facto custodians
in K.R.S. section 403.270(1). 94 The statute provides:
(1)(a) As used in this chapter and KRS 405.020, unless the context
requires otherwise, "de facto custodian" means a person who has been
shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the
person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three
(3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is
three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for
Community Based Services. Any period of time after a legal proceeding
has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child
shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the
person for the required minimum period.95
90 Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 780, 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003).
91 Id. at 780.
92 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
9' Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 782.
94 K.R.S. § 403.270(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
95 id.
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The statute goes on to state that "[o]nce a court determines that a
person meets the definition of de facto custodian, the court shall give the
person the same standing in custody matters that is given, to each parent
under this section."96 Thus, if a person is found to be a child's de facto
custodian, that person will have standing identical to that of a parent in
certain matters, including a suit for child custody. Importantly, this statute
only applies to persons with sole physical custody over a child, who are
essentially stepping into the parents' positions.97 This operates to the
exclusion of relationships like those of stepparents and other live-in
arrangements.
In Sherfey, the court reasoned that K.R.S. section 403.270, while not
requiring any specific showing of unfitness, still implicates two of the most
important factors regarding parental fitness included in the former statute.9"
Specifically, the statute asserts that in order to be a de facto custodian a
person must be the "primary caregiver for, and financial supporter, of [the]
child." 99 In addition, the statute requires a showing of "clear and convincing
evidence" regarding the criteria for a nonparent to be conferred with de
facto custodian status.100
Therefore, the statute still incorporates the fitness factors and, in doing
so, allows the court to consider parental fitness in making their custodial
determination. The court concluded that because of the Sherfeys' poor
behavior in abandoning their child and their failure to provide any care,
financial, or emotional support for the child-all factors under the former
statute regarding the determination of parental fitness--the parents would
have been deemed unfit under the prior statute as well.' Thus, their
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated
because they were unfit parents under either version of the statute.0 2 A
separate determination of their unfitness was not required; rather, the
parents' right to raise their child and provide care for him ended when they
did not perform their parental duties satisfactorily.'
0 3
Although Sherfey is the most recent case addressing Kentucky's
approach to de facto custody, Kentucky has a history of cases that also
96 Id.
97 d.
98Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 782.
99 K.R.S. § 403.270(1)(a).
1O Id.




support the result in Sherfey. In Williams v. Phelps, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals stated, "A party must have a real, direct, present and substantial
right in the subject matter of the controversy. Standing is the right to appear
and seek relief in a particular proceeding."'' 4 In Williams, the court granted
standing to a nonparent in a custody battle.'10 In French v. Barnett, the
Court of Appeals held that a grandmother was not required to have a
separate hearing to determine her de facto status regarding her grandchild.
Even though the child's natural mother was not deemed unfit, the grand-
mother was granted de facto status using similar reasoning as the court in
Sherfey. 
0 6
Thus, in Kentucky, the approach taken to confer de facto custodian
status upon a nonparent has several requirements. First, the child must be
in the sole custody of the person for a specific amount of time. Second, the
person must supply all of the child's physical and financial needs. Third,
these factors must be proven by a standard of clear and convincing
evidence. 07 There is no specific requirement that a parent be subjected to
a separate fitness determination in order to conform with the purposes of
the statute.'
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE KENTUCKY APPROACH
Although from the specific facts of Sherfey it seems that K.R.S. section
403.270 achieved the correct result for T.S., one must consider whether the
statute will provide the best result in a majority of cases without infringing
upon parents' due process rights under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court's modem pro-natural parent approach to custody disputes suggest
" Williams v. Phelps, 961 S.W.2d 40,41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Winn v.
First Bank of Irvington, 581 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)).
10 Id. at 42.
"0 French v. Barnett, 43 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). In French, a
couple with two children divorced and the mother was granted custody of both
children. Nevertheless, the children moved in with their paternal grandmother two
years after the divorce. Shortly thereafter, the parents entered into an agreement
giving the father full custody of one child and temporary custody of the other. The
children, however, remained in the care of their paternal grandmother. The
grandmother petitioned the court for custody. Although there was not a hearing
regarding whether the grandmother was a de facto custodian or whether the parents
were unfit, the court nonetheless granted the grandmother's petition for custody of
both children. Id. at 290.
107 K-R.S. § 403.270(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
108 Id.
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that Kentucky's statute may violate the United States Constitution by not
requiring a specific showing of parental unfitness or a waiver of parental
rights.'0 9 Even the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Consalvi v. Cawood,
expressed that "[o]n its face, our statute is not unconstitutional; however,
the question of whether the statute may be applied unconstitutionally is
expressly reserved."" 0 The fact that the court mentioned the issue of an "as
applied" challenge to the statute creates the possibility for the statute to be
unconstitutionally applied.
Perhaps Kentucky has taken the best approach. By not requiring a
specific determination of parental unfitness, yet retaining the most
important unfitness factors, K.R.S. section 403.270 allows courts to focus
upon the best interests of the child. However, the statute also protects a
natural parent's right to custody of his or her child unless that parent has
not fulfilled the most significant aspects of his or her parental duties. In
addition, the statute imposes a burden of "clear and convincing evidence"
upon the de facto custodian to prove that they have met the requirements
of the statute."'
These limitations provide additional protection to biological parents.
In Consalvi v. Cawood, the Kentucky Court of Appeals discussed the
narrow interpretation that the statute should be given."2 In Consalvi, a
couple married shortly after the birth of their first child." 3 After separating
and reuniting a number of times, and following the birth of another child,
the couple divorced.'" Although the wife told her husband that he was the
father of both of the children, paternity tests subsequently revealed that he
was the father of neither child.' The trial court ordered joint custody to the
husband regarding both children, relying on K.R.S. section 403.270 for its
ruling, stating that he was a de facto custodian.1 6 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the husband did not fall within the purview
of K.R.S. section 403.270 because the husband was not the sole caregiver
for the children; rather, both he and the children's mother cared for the
children." 7 The court stated, "It is not enough that a person provide for a
'o See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
"l0 Consalvi v. Cawood, 63 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
K.R.S. § 403.270(1)(b).
i12 Consalvi, 63 S.W.3d at 200.






child alongside the natural parent; the statute is clear that one must literally
stand in the place of the natural parent to qualify as a de facto custodian."' "
Such an interpretation of the statute allows the courts some degree of
flexibility regarding the best interests of the child, while also allowing the
court to exclude persons who fall outside the statute's strict boundaries.
Thus, while the statute protects a parent's fundamental constitutional rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not confine the courts to a strict
determination of unfitness before the court is allowed to consider what is
in a child's best interests.
K.R.S. section 403.270 promotes the best outcome for all parties
involved. Parents who are clearly not assisting in their child's physical,
mental, and emotional development will stand before the court on equal
ground with the people in the child's life who do provide those things.
Importantly, however, the statute does not automatically confer custody on
the de facto custodian. The statute simply allows courts to consider both the
parents' and de facto custodian's positions in determining the child's best
interests. As a result, the well-being of the child, rather than the parents'
wishes, are of primary import. Consequently, the child will be placed in the
home that will better nurture the child's physical, intellectual, and
emotional development.
VIII. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other states have adopted different approaches to the determination of
de facto custodian status and the rights of de facto custodians. These
approaches range from liberal to highly conservative, creating a marked
lack of uniformity across the United States. A comparison of these different
approaches is helpful in defining the current constitutional debate regarding
Kentucky's de facto custodian statute.
Indiana's de facto custodian statute is much like the one found in
Kentucky. Indiana defines the term "de facto custodian" in a manner
identical to K.R.S. section 403.270(1), implementing the same time and
care requirements." 9 Although the Indiana statute grants de facto custodi-
118Id.
"' IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2003). Section 35.5 provides:
"De facto custodian" . . . means a person who has been the primary
caregiver for, and the financial support of, a child who has resided with the
person for at least:
(1) six (6) months if the child is less than three (3) years of age; or
(2) one (1) year if the child is at least three (3) years of age.
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ans standing in custody disputes, it does not automatically treat parents and
de facto custodians equally or subsequently base the custody decision on
the best interests of the child. Rather, the court must consider a variety of
factors in addition to the traditional best interest factors, including the de
facto custodian's wishes, the parent's intent in placing the child with the de
facto custodian, and the circumstances in which the child was allowed to
remain with the custodian. 2 Only after these additional factors are con-
sidered is the de facto custodian permitted to be a party in the custody
proceeding. l2
One recent case, Froelich v. Clark,'22 is particularly helpful in
explaining Indiana's treatment of de facto custodians. In that case, the
mother of a nine-year-old boy petitioned to regain custody of her son from
his paternal grandmother, who had been the child's sole caretaker for an
extended period and had been deemed the child's de facto custodian by the
court as the child's guardian. 23 The grandmother argued that she was the
Any period after a child custody proceeding has been commenced may not
be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for
the required period.
'2 Id. § 31-14-13-2.5. Section 2.5(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) In addition to the factors listed in section 2 of this chapter, the court
shall consider the following factors in determining custody:
(1) The wishes of the child's de facto custodian.
(2) The extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured, and
supported by the de facto custodian.
(3) The intent of the child's parent in placing the child with the de facto
custodian.
(4) The circumstances under which the child was allowed to remain in
the custody of the de facto custodian, including whether the child was






1 Id. § 2.5(c).
'z Froelich v. Clark (In re Guardianship of L.L. and J.L.), 745 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001).
123 Id. at 225. The boy's mother and father had one son born prior to their
marriage and one son born following their marriage. Shortly after the mother and
father were married, due to an inappropriate lifestyle for raising children, the
parents left the boys with the paternal grandmother, who later obtained permanent
guardianship of the boys. After divorcing the boys' father and multiple prior
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child's de facto custodian and as such, the "statutory amendments removed
any presumption favoring the natural parent in a third party child custody
dispute."'124 However, the court held that even when a third party is deemed
a de facto custodian, the presumption favoring parental custody remains.1
25
The court defined the proper standard to apply in such a dispute as follows:
First, there is a presumption in all cases that the natural parent should
have custody of his or her child. The third party bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption by clear and cogent evidence. Evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption may, but need not necessarily, consist
of the parent's present unfitness, or past abandonment of the child such
that the affections of the child and third party have become so interwoven
that to sever them would seriously mar and endanger the future happiness
of the child. However, a general finding that it would be in the child's
"best interest" to be placed in the third party's custody is not sufficient to
rebut the presumption. If the presumption is rebutted, then the court
engages in a general "best interests" analysis.
126
Thus, Indiana, while defining de facto custodian identically to
Kentucky, takes a different approach to determine the custody between a
de facto custodian and a natural parent. Rather than treating the de facto
custodian and parent equally in a custody dispute and determining custody
of the "best interests" standard, Indiana requires an additional safeguard by
maintaining the pro-parent presumption and a heightened showing of "best
interests."'127 As a result, the Indiana court notes that "[i]f the 'best interest
rule' was the only standard needed without anything else, to deprive the
natural parent of custody of his own child, then what is to keep the govern-
ment or third parties from passing judgment with little, if any, care for the
natural parents."12 The court implied that any other standard would violate
the Due Process Clause under the Supreme Court's holding in Troxel v.
Granville. 1
29
attempts to regain permanent custody of the children, the mother presented
evidence of a reformed, stable, lifestyle. Id. at 226-26.
124 Id. at 229-30.
125 Id. at 230.
126 Id. at 230-31.
127 id.
'
28 Id. at 231 (quoting In re Marriage of Huber, 723 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000)).
'29 See id. The court notes that
[t]his observation is entirely consistent with the views of the Supreme
Court, which has stated that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a
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Under the Indiana court's analysis, it appears that the Kentucky statute
would be found unconstitutional, as Kentucky bypasses additional pro-
tections and allows the court to evaluate a person deemed a de facto cus-
todian and a natural parent purely on the traditional "best interests of the
child" standard.
While Indiana adopted a similar approach to Kentucky, Arizona's
approach is notably different: Absent a showing of unfitness, if a parent
voluntarily relinquishes custody to another person and subsequently wants
the child back, the custodian may not retain custody of the child. 3 ° In
Bradbury v. Charlebois, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he
parent-child relationship cannot be terminated merely because termination
may be in the best interests of the child." Rather, the parent's unfitness
must be proven for the custodian to be eligible to retain custody of the
child.' Although the Arizona court has failed to explicitly state that a
grant of custody without a fitness determination would be unconstitutional,
it may reasonably be inferred. By contrast, in Kentucky, if a person meets
the de facto custodian requirements, the custodian has equal standing with
the parents, absent a specific showing of parental unfitness. 3 2 Conse-
quently, the court is able to base its custody decision on the child's best
interests.'33
California, while permitting de facto custodians standing in custody
proceedings, does not equate a de facto custodian with a natural parent in
many respects. In Clifford v. Superior Court, the California Court of
Appeals stated that "de facto parenthood does not give de facto parents the
rights and responsibilities of parents or guardians."' 34 More specifically, a
de facto custodian in the state of California has no right to "reunification
services, custody, or visitation,"'35 whereas in Kentucky, a de facto custo-
State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could
be made."
Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000)).
'30 Bradbury v. Charlebois (In re Guardianship of Mikrut), 858 P.2d 689, 692
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); see also Stewart v. Superior Court ex rel. County of
Maricopa, 787 P.2d 126, 128-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "a state may
not presume the unfitness of a parent, but instead must provide individualized
procedural safeguards (notice, hearing and proof of unfitness) before the state can
terminate parental rights" (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972))).
131 Bradbury, 858 P.2d at 692.
132 K.R.S. § 403.270(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
133 Id. § 403.270(2).
' Clifford v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
135 Id.
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dian is equivalent to a biological parent in these respects. 3 6 As for
standing, California courts makes it clear that de facto custodians are not
equal to a child's natural parents.' In fact, one California court held that
"[d]e facto parents are not equated with biological parents or guardians for
purposes of dependency proceedings and standing to participate does not
give them all of the rights and preferences accorded such persons."'3 As
a result, the California approach to de facto custodianship is more con-
servative than the Kentucky approach.
While many states have adopted conservative approaches to de facto
custodianship, other states have adopted approaches even more liberal than
Kentucky's statute. In fact, the Kentucky statute has been criticized as not
being liberal enough, especially concerning the rights of stepparents.' 39
Critics of the statute propose that Kentucky should adopt provisions similar
to those of Connecticut and Oregon, where any person who has a signifi-
cant relationship with the child is permitted to intervene in child custody
proceedings. 40 In these states, little emphasis is placed on the child being
solely in the care of the third party seeking custody for a specific length of
time. 4 '
It is clear that different jurisdictions approach the rights and responsi-
bilities of de facto custodians in a variety of ways. It is difficult to
determine which approach is correct due to the individual facts of each
case. In Sherfey, there should be no question as to the appropriateness of
the Court's grant of equal standing to the grandparents in a custody
proceeding. When one takes into consideration the view of the Supreme
Court and other jurisdictions as to the fundamental rights of parents and the
different requirements for de facto custodians, however, the line is much
less clear.
136 K.R.S. § 403.270(2); see also Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003).
131 In re Crystal J., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Clifford v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
131 In re Crystal J., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650 (quoting In re Rachel C., 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
139 Lawrence Schlarn, Third-Party Standing in Child Custody Disputes: Will
Kentucky's New "De Facto" Guardian Provision Help?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 368,
409 (2000). This author asserts that Kentucky should consider revising its statute
to include a broader perception of the word "parent." He writes that such a revision
would "allow for greater judicial flexibility in choosing custodians in the best
interests of children." Id.




KENTUCKY'S DE FACTO CUSTODIAN STATUTE
IX. CONCLUSION
Sherfey v. Sherfey is without doubt a controversial case. Depriving a
child's natural parents of custody in favor of another party is a serious
matter that evokes both emotion and criticism. T.S. was voluntarily
abandoned by his parents and was obviously happy living with his grand-
parents, who provided all of his care.'42 Perhaps the particular facts in
Sherfey leave one with the impression that the court made the right
decision. The more difficult question is, in spite of the individual facts of
Sherfey, will K.R.S. section 403.270(1) reach a proper, constitutionally
sound outcome in most cases? As admitted by the court in Sherfey, the
natural parents would have been deemed unfit had the previous factors for
unfitness been applied. Based on this rationale, it is easy to constitutionally
justify the court's decision. A case may arise, however, where a person
meets the statutory requirements of a de facto custodian and the natural
parents are also fit. In this situation, it appears that the statute comes much
closer to violating the parents' constitutional right to raise his or her child
as they see fit.
However, other jurisdictions, by the requirements they set forth for de
facto custodians, would hold that the standing rights granted to the
grandparents in Sherfey would be a constitutional violation, greatly
infringing on the rights of parents. There are states, on the other hand, that
do not require a strict showing of parental unfitness to confer equal
standing upon nonparents in custody cases.'4 3 It is a difficult situation
anytime the natural parents' actions are detrimental to the child and in
whose custody the child does not wish to remain with his or her parents
because parents' rights and the best interest of child conflict. If deemed to
be fit, a parents' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment will prevail over
the wishes of the child or the persons who care for the child.
If narrowly construed, Kentucky's statute reaches a desirable compro-
mise between two extremes, allowing a nonparent who adequately cares for
a child's physical and financial needs, with whom the child has lived for at
least six months, to have equal standing with the child's parents, whose
actions may be less than exemplary.'" In reaching this compromise, the
court may examine the totality of the circumstances and determine the best
result for the child.
142 Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1110 (2003).
43 Schlam, supra note 139, at 403-05.
'44K.R.S. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
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Although the statute may raise questions of constitutionality, the end
result is sound: A child is placed in the custody of the person who cares for
him the best, whether it be the biological parent or the de facto custodian.
Because Kentucky's statute is not overly broad as to include persons who
may have an interest in the child, but who do not provide the every day care
and control over the child's life like that of a parent, the statute comes to
an admirable compromise. It allows only those persons who act in loco
parentis to seek custody of the child. No specific finding of the fitness of
a parent is required, but K.R.S. section 403.270(1) does take into consider-
ation the most important of the former fitness factors and in doing so,
enables the court to determine what is best for each particular child. The
decision in Sherfey v. Sherfey is an excellent example of how K.R.S.
section 403.270(1) can work to the advantage of the child. It allows the
court to weigh the propriety of each party in a custody case, and reach a
decision that is in the child's best interests.
